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1. Introduction
Consider a game {ft,F,R} where ft is a sample space, R is a
set of prizes and F is a set of actions or decision functions F(*)
mapping ft into R. In a statistical decision problem we may have,
following the notation of Ferguson [4], ft = QxX or ft = X where
is a parameter space and X a sample space for a random variable whose
distribution may depend on 6e0. When confronted with such a decision
problem, a rational decision maker will seek to specify a preference
*
ordering on the prizes. If the state of nature is known with certainty,
the decision maker will attempt to choose an action in F which yields
the most preferred prize. The problem is that, in most cases, the
decision maker does not operate in a risk-free environment. Instead,
decisions must usually be made in the face of uncertainty about the
state of nature. It is the objective of the decision maker to use
whatever knowledge he has about the states of nature and the resulting
consequences of his possible actions to select the most desirable
alternative available to him.
What analytical tools are available to a decision maker to help
him make rational decisions in the face of uncertainty? First, let us
look at the case where the decision maker knows the probability distri-
bution over the states of nature as he would, for example, if weft
were selected as the result of a gamble such as drawing a card, rolling
dice or spinning a roulette wheel. Let us denote this probability by
P. If the set of prizes R is reasonably rich and the decision maker's
preference ordering satisfies certain reasonable restrictions, a funda-
mental result of utility theory (see von Neumann and Morgenstern [8])
guarantees that a rational decision maker should behave as if he had
assigned a numerical measure (utility) u over R*, the class of
distributions over R, and that he would prefer an action F^F




Thus, in order to evaluate a rule F, a rational person should ascertain
the values, to himself, of the various prizes; he should weigh those
values with the probabilities that the prizes will be received using F.
Now, let us consider the case in which the probability distribution
of the states of nature is not known by the decision maker. Subjectivists
would have the decision maker utilize the available information about the
states of nature and the context of the problem to "personally" assess
the probabilities. He then simply uses his subjective distribution, in
lieu of the unknown probability distribution P, in the manner described
above.
A second approach to this problem would be to have the decision
maker establish a preference ordering over V* , the set of randomized
decision rules (probability distributions over V = {uoF: FeF}) , satis-
fying certain reasonable restrictions [4]. The optimal decision rule
D^eP* would then be determined by selecting a member (if any) of P* with
the highest preference rank.
In this paper we show that these two approaches for the case of
decision making under uncertainty are equivalent. More precisely, we
show that if the decision maker's preference pattern over V* is
appropriately related to his preference pattern over R*, then his
preferences on V* agree with a utility function U on P*, and there
exists a probability measure P such that the U utility of a degenerate
element of V* (i.e., an element of V) is the expected value of the
utilities u on R* with respect to the probability measure P.
Mathematically, if D is an element of V* degenerate at uoF,
U(D) = u(F(w))dP(w)
a
This means simply that the rationality criteria of utility theory are
such that the decision maker is forced to act as if he knows the distri-
bution over ft and a utility scaling of the consequences, and an optimum
decision is one maximizing the expected utility with respect to that
distribution. Although the decision maker may not explicitly state the
"subjective probability measure" P, such a distribution is implicit
from his utility assignments. In the statistical decision problem with
ft = 0xX, the marginal distribution over Q is the "prior" distribution
of the states of nature.
This result is not surprising, for the axioms of utility theory
used as guides for consistency in judgment in ranking preferences impute
to the decision maker the ability of making arbitrarily find discrim-
inations in judgment. Intuitively, it is reasonable that his subjective
probability distribution over ft is induced by his utility scaling of
the alternatives and the consequences. Suppose ft = {w. ,u)-,. . . ,w }, and
rT and r., are elements of R* such that = u(rT ) £ u(r) £ u(r._) = 1
JU M L a
for all reR*. Let D eP* be such that D.(w ) = 1 and D (w ) =
for all i 4 j. Then, it seems plausible that the utility value U(D.)
is (up to normalization) the decision maker's subjective probability that
the state of nature is uk. For example, take 0, = {w.,03^} and suppose
that D is such that D(uj-) - 1 and D(u)
2 )
- ("heads" = oj. pays
$1 and "tails" = w_ pays $0). If the decision maker's utility
function assigns D the value 0.3 (using that utility function nor-
malized over the interval 10,1]) it would not be surprising to discover
that P({w }) = 0.3.
That a decision maker's utility function over V is an expectation
of the utilities of the prizes with respect to a probability distribution,
which we call his subjective distribution, is not a new result. In fact,
results of this nature can be found in many references: see, for example,
Ferguson 14] , DeGroot {3] , Fine [5] , Fishburn [6] and Anscombe and Aumann
JlJ. The approach referenced in the literature is, nevertheless, un-
necessarily restrictive. For example, the published results apply only
to the case where ft is finite and where the assumptions connecting the
two preference patterns are much stronger than required.
In this paper we provide a rather simple development which relaxes
the assumptions found in the literature. In fact, after the appropriate
machinery is established, we show that the result is a straightforward
application of a powerful theorem of mathematical analysis.
We devote the following section to the development of a mathematical
structure leading to a general statement of existence of a subjective
probability measure. In Section 3 we discuss how the probability measure
may actually be constructed. In Sections 4 and 5, we illustrate such
constructions with examples, which suggest applications.
2. Development
We take as given a set of axioms of utility theory such as those
found in Ferguson J4, pp. 11-20]. Let R be a set of prizes and R
a class of distributions over R, so that R is closed under convex
*
linear combinations (that is, r, and r„eR imply that ar. +
(l-a)r 9 eR for €. a ^ 1) . We assume that all degenerate probability
distributions belong to R , so K is embedded in R . Assume the
_*
decision maker has a preference ordering on R satisfying conditions
*
which guarantee the existence of a utility function on R . Let u be
the unique utility function which maps R onto the interval [0,1]
.
(This is possible provided there is a least desirable prize r and a
i-i
most desirable prize r._ in R)
.
M
Let ft be a locally compact Hausdorff space, and let F be the
_*
class of continuous functions mapping ft into R with compact support.
Consider the class of functions
V m {uoF: FeF},
We denote the elements of V by D . We illustrate the relationships
of these mappings (the mapping U: V ->• 10,1] is discussed later) in
Figure 1. With the u utility induced by a preference ordering, prizes
in K are determined up to indifference by their utilities. Therefore,
we partition k into equivalence classes of prizes according to their
utilities. We define the equivalence class R = {r: u(r) = a} and
the family C = {R : ae{0,l]}. This establishes a one-to-one corre-
spondence between the interval [0,1] and C. Without loss of generality,
in the remainder we identify R with C.
FIGURE 1
Lemma 1 : V is the class of all continuous functions from fl into
10,1 J which have compact support.














It is easily seen that p is a metric on K and that, with the topology
induced by this metric, u is a continuous function from R to [0,1].
Being compositions of continuous functions, the elements of V are
themselves continuous. Further, it is clear that the support of D_
and the support of F are identical. For example, let A = {w: D (to) > 0}
r
and B = {co: F(w) 4 r}. Then, u(F(w)) - D_(u>) > implies F(w) 4 r T
which, in turn, implies that uieB. Thus AcB. Conversely, if weB, then
F(u>) > and D
F
(u>) > so weA. Thus, B = A. Since the support of
F is compact, D„ is a continuous function from Q to 10,1] with
r
compact support.
On the other hand, let D be any continuous function from 0, into
[0,1] with compact support. Since u " is continuous, u oDeF,
and D is a member of P. []
We now show that V is sufficiently rich to support a utility
function, that is, V = V .
Lemma 2 : V is closed under convex combinations.
Proof : Let D. and D
2
be members of V and < X < 1. Then AD
1










sum of two continuous functions, is continuous, and the support of D is
the union of the support of D, and the support of D
?
. Thus, the support
of D is compact and DcV. The case for A = or A = 1 is trivial. []
We now assume that the decision maker has a preference ordering
over V which determines a corresponding utility function U. Beyond
the requirements imposed on U by the utility axioms, we require only
that U be bounded on V , say |u(D) | £ M for all DeP, and that
U(D«) = 0, where D
n
(w) = for all uefl. Later, we discuss how to
normalize U appropriately.
Recall our remark that specification of U appears to determine
a probability distribution such that the decision maker behaves as if he
were taking expectations of the utilities of the prizes with respect to
that distribution. Mathematical analysis gives consideration to such
representation of linear functionals as integrals (expectations) with
respect to certain measures (probabilities). In a consistent utility ap-







when the probability measure P over ft is known.
We wish to show the converse; that is, if U is a utility function
defined over the class V y then there exists a probability measure P
such that U(DF) is the expectation of D^, with respect to P. The
Riesz representation theorem guarantees this converse is indeed true under
certain conditions.
Theorem 1; (Riesz Representation Theorem)
Let ft be a locally compact Hausdorff space, and let U be a
positive linear functional on the class V of real-valued continuous
e
functions on ft with compact support. Then there exists a a-algebra
M over ft which contains the Borel sets in ft, and there exists a
unique positive measure y on M which represents U in the sense that
(a) U
e
(D) = D(oOdy(u)) (VDeP )
e
(b) u(K) < °° for every compact set KC^.
(c) y(E) - sup (y(K): K^, K compact}
for every open set E.
Proof : See Rudin [7, pp. 40-46].
In order to apply this theorem in our problem we must verify that,
with appropriate extensions, the conditions of the theorem are met. The
only difficulty with applying the theorem directly is that U is not a
linear functional over V. We are therefore required to extend V to a
vector space V and U to a linear functional U over V .
e e e
Toward that end, let V be the linear manifold generated by V
and define U over V as follows:
e e
For D., , D_ , . . . , D in V and scalars a n , a_ , ..., a ,12 n 12 n
n n
U ( y a.D.) = 7 a. U(D.) (4)
i=l i=l
With these extensions we now assert
:
Lemma 3: The linear manifold V is the vector space of all continuous
e r
functions from ft into the reals with compact support, C (fi) , and the
mapping U defined by (4) is a positive linear functional over V .
Proof: (a) That V is a vector space follows from the fact that it is
e
n





{a.} and functions {D.}.
Since scalar multiples of continuous functions and sums of continuous func-
tions are continuous, it is clear that D is continuous. Let S be the
n
support of D. and S the support of D. Then, clearly, SC.U S,. Since
S is closed and a subset of a compact set .^-.S., S is itself compact,
Thus, D has compact support and DeC (ft) so that D ^ (ft).
c e c
Now let GeC (ft) and G"*~ and G~ be nonnegative functions such
c
that G = G+ - G~. Both G+ and G" are in C (ft). Let M+ and M~
c
be such that M^ = max CMw) and M~ = max G~(oj) , and define D and
ft ft
D~ as follows (if M or M are zero, the result follows with slight
modification)
:
„+, v G+ (o)) -, v G~(u>)
D+(o)) =
-p^- and D ( u ) = -^ .
Then D+ and D are in V and G = M^D"1" - M~D"eP_ . This implies that
C (ft) ^ V and, therefore, C (ft) = V .
p.
(b) In order to show U is a linear functional on V , let a, b be
e e




(aD1+bD2 ) = 0.<«<j^D^) + bf^ajjDy))
where D.. = ja^.T>^. ; D_ = Ta-.D.. ; D., . and D_.eP and a, b, a n . ,1 L li li 2 L 2i 2i lx 2i li









) = I (aa1 .U(D1 .) + ba^U^.)) = aU^) + bU^.) .i=l
(c) We now show that U is positive. Let D = Ja.D. be nonnegative,
i.e., for all weft, D(w) ^ 0. Since D , D , ..., D are in V, it




(i) a. = for all i
1
(il) a. > for all 1
(iii) a ^ for some i and a < for some i.
Case (i) ; D = and is in V, so U (D) = U(D) = 0.
Case (ii) ; U
e
(D) = J a±
U(.Q
±
) * since U(D ) ^ for all i.
i
Case (iii) : Let b = £ a.. Define D' = (l/b)D. Since D' is
{i: a.>0} X
i
nonnegative and D'(cj) = £ ai D.(w) ^ 1, we note that D'eP. Thus
i ""E"
x
U (D) = bU(D') ;> 0. I]
e
We now cast the Riesz Representation Theorem for a utility problem.
Since U agrees with U on V, in particular, the Riesz Representation
Theorem gives an integral representation of U,
Corollary 1 : There exists a a-algebra M over ft which contains the
Borel sets in ft, and there exists a unique probability measure P on
M such that for all DeP
U(D) = D(w)dP(w).
a
Proof : We must show that, with appropriate normalization of the utility
function U, the induced measure u in Theorem 1 is a probability measure.
Let K be an arbitrary compact subset of ft. Then by Urysohn's lemma
(see, for example, Rudin [7, p. 39]), there exists a continuous real-valued
function D on Q which is identically 1 on K and for which the support
K K
of D , say S, is compact. Thus D eV and
U
e
(DK) = U(DK ) = DK (w)dy(w) = du(u>) + DK (w)dy(a)).
ft K S-K
11
Now, since U is bounded by M we have that du(cj) + DK (u))dy(u>) s» M.
and, consequently
K S-K
y(K) = dy(w) £ M.
K
By Theorem 1, y(ft) = sup {u(K): Kfcft, K compact}. Since y(K) £ M for
all compact sets K we have that y(fi) ^ M.
Let us select that utility function U' on V which is equivalent
to U (up to a linear transformation) such that U'(D) , . U(D)
.
y k.««/
Theorem 1 now implies
v'^-^k^'W) D(w)dy(w) .
fl
On taking P(E) =
^jrfr for all EeM, we get
U'(D) = D(a))dP(w) (VDeP)
where P is a probability measure on M. []
Observe that if F.. and F„eF differ only on a measurable set
A on which u(F..(u))) £ u(F_(w)) and D.. = uoF- and D. = uoF_, then















Thus the two utility functions, u and U, must be monotonically related.
We state this "monotone property" as
12
Corollary 2 ; If F, and F 2 eF differ only on a measurable set A on
which uCF^w)) ^u(F
2
(w)), then UCuoF^ £ U(uoF
2
) .
We also note that if ft is compact, F contains all constant
*
functions from ft to R . Consider the function F.,er such that
*
Fw (to) = rw , where r„ is the most desirable prize in R . Now ifM M M •
F is any other function differing only on a measurable set A, we have
u(F(u>)) <: uCF^Gd)) (Vweft)M
and, by the monotone property,
U(uoF) <; U(uoFM).
n.
That Is, the decision function which yields the prize with the greatest
utility for all outcomes in ft must have maximum U utility. Thus, for








and no further normalization of the measure y is required to guarantee
that y is a probability measure. The significance of this observation
is that, for ft compact, U may be normalized directly (before
application of Theorem 1) in terms of its value at one point in V.
3. Construction of the Probability Measure
A useful by-product of our approach to showing the existence of
the probability measure P is that the Riesz Representation Theorem also
shows how the measure y is constructed. Following Rudin, define "D ^V"
to mean
13
a) V is an open subset of ft
b) Defl
e
c) £ D(o)) £ 1 for all weft
d) The support of D lies in V.
For each, open set Vcft, the proof of the Riesz Representation Theorem
shows that
y(V) = sup {U (D): D ^V}
V e
e
Further, for any EcM, define
y(E) = inf {y(V): E£V, V open}.
In our application, the set of all DeP such that £ D(w) ^ 1 for
all weft is exactly the set V. Also, for DeP, U (D) = U(D) so we
have
Corollary 3 ; For each open set Vcft,
y(V) = sup {U(D): Snctf}
P
D
where S_ is the support of D. For any EeM
y(E) = inf {y(V): EcV, V open}.
This is important because it allows us to determine y on M
without extending to P or to the linear functional U . For any
AeM, define P(A) = ^^- . Then P: M ^ [0,1] is the probability
measure determined by the decision maker.
14
Corollary 4 : With ft countable and the discrete topology, y(V) = U(D )




Proof : With the discrete topology over ft, D eV (every function from
ft into 10,1] is continuous). Let D be any element of V such that
S (the support of D) is contained in V. Then, by Corollary 2,
U(D) £ UCD-rr) • (Indeed, by direct computation,





y(V) = sup {U(D): SDcV} = U(Dy ) []
Remark : Suppose B is a basis for a vector space. The assignment of
values of a linear functional over a basis for its domain completely
determines the functional. Hence, the assignment of utilities over a
basis set will, under conditions of Theorem 1, determine the induced
probability measure. Indeed, as is seen in the examples of the next
section, the probability measure is determined by a U assignment to a
class of functions generating V.
15
4. Numerical Examples
We now consider three examples of the construction of the induced
probability measure. One example concerns a simple case where ft is
finite, another involves a problem where ft is denumerable, and the
last determines a probability measure for a continuous sample space ft.
For the case where ft is finite, we use a horse race example,
which is the setting for the pioneering paper by Anscombe and Aumann [1]
.
The example serves to provide insight into the construction of the sub-
jective probability measure and, also, to show the correspondence between
the notation of Anscombe and Aumann and that of this paper.
Example 1 : Let ft = {h. ,h2» . . . ,h,-} be the set of five horses running
in a given race. We assume that the decision maker is given the chance
to observe the odds (prizes) from the totalizator board as determined











Odds 1 to 1 3 to 1 7 to 1 11 to 1 23 to 1
The decision maker has the option of betting on any of the five horses.
Without loss of generality we assume that the decision maker has a total
of $1 to wager. Consequently, the set of prizes is
R = {r =-l,ri=l,r2=3,r3=7,r4=ll,r5
=23}
(He can bet on h... and either win $1 or lose $1, or he can bet
tu and either win $3 or lose $1, etc.) Let R be the set of
16
on
probability distributions over R, and let r. be that distribution in
*
R degenerate at r.. We take the decision-maker's utility for the
distributions r to be the identity function normalized so that all




















uCr ) 1/12 1/6 1/3 1/2 1
Let F be the set of all decision functions mapping ft to R (the
class of "lotteries" over R ) which differ in the prizes received as
a result of the outcome of the horse race. Define the lotteries
F . : ft * R as follows
:
3




for j = 0, 1, 2, ..., 5.
Let V = {uoF: FeF} and represent uoF. by D., so
Djfo) =
u(r ) if a) = h
otherwise.
Taking the discrete topology over Q (the set of all subsets of ft)
trivially ensures that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied. We
























Now define the lotteries
otherwise







p. = U(d!) = U(D.)/u(r*).
3 3 J J
The mass function induced over ft is therefore as shown in the table
below.
h *! "2 h3 \ "5
P[h wins] 3/8 3/8 5/48 1/12 1/16
Observe that we were able to determine the decision maker's probabilities
from knowledge of his utilities of only the five lotteries D, , D~ , D_,
D, and D c . This is because these lotteries form a basis for all4 5
lotteries; that is, each DeP can be written as a linear combination of
the "basis lotteries". This is an important point since the decision
maker is not required to state his utility for each lottery in V, but
rather he need only make assignments to those in the basis. Once he
states his utilities for the lotteries in a basis, we can determine his
18
subjective probability distribution over the outcomes of the horse race,
and in turn calculate the utility of any other lottery in V using the
expectation property of the utility function. This relieves the decision
maker of having to evaluate complicated lotteries, between which he may
be uncertain in his preferences, so as to yield values consistent with
his more strongly held preferences.
Example 2 : Let Q be the set of positive integers N. We interpret
the outcome neft as the number of years hence until a total cure for a
particular type of cancer is discovered. Let R = {r~,r, } be a class
of prizes where r
n
and r.. are the prizes "no help" and "total cure",
respectively, and let K be the class of probability distributions over
A A it
R. Interpret r_ and r. as the distributions in R degenerate at
*
r. and r. and, for < a < 1, r is that distribution which gives
1 a
prize r- with probability a and prize r
fl
with probability 1 - a.
*
We interpret the prize r as some progress somewhat short of a total
cure, perhaps a treatment which reduces pain or which increases the
patient's lifetime. We suppose that the decision maker has utility a
for prize r (O^a^l) ; that is,
u(r ) = a
a
Let V be the class of functions from ft into [0,1] (as before,
we assume the discrete topology for ft so that all functions are continuous
with compact support). In particular, let
(




The function D eV corresponds to the case where no progress is made in
the first n - 1 years and a total cure is found in the n year. We
suppose the decision maker assigns utilities to the functions D , neN,
as follows:
U(D ) = kpn , < p < 1
where k is some proportionality constant.
Now let p(n) be the probability that exactly n - 1 years pass
before a total cure is discovered. Then, by Corollary 1, and the
definition of D
,n




Since £ p(oj) =1, we find that k = (l-p)/p and p(n) = (l-p)p
0J=1
Thus, the decision maker's subjective probability distribution for the
number of years that will elapse before a cure is found is geometric.
He is therefore implicitly viewing the discovery of a cure in a given
year as a Bernoulli trial with probability of success p.
One could argue that the probability of success should not be
constant from year to year, but rather an increasing function of n (as
more knowledge is gained, the probability of success increases). Thus,
the decision maker might want to re-evaluate his utilities when presented
with his induced distribution. If he is content with the disclosure of
his induced distribution, he can utilize this information to calculate
utilities of more complex alternatives. For example, his utility of an
arbitrary alternative DeP is found to be
20




Example 3 : Consider a ship maneuvering about in open sea in the presence
of an enemy mine. The ship is equipped with a device which enables it to
search the sea in a circular neighborhood for the location of the enemy
mine. The success of the ship in locating the mine depends on the
characteristics of the search device (as well as sea state, electromagnetic
noise, etc.). We suppose that the ship is interested in maneuvering about
within a radius of one unit from its present position.
Let V be the class of continuous functions from the unit disc
into the interval [0,1] . Using polar coordinates to describe points in
the unit disc (ship position is taken as the origin) , one can interpret
D(r,6), DeP, as a measure of the capability of the search device to
detect a mine at the point (r,9). We will assume that the capabilities
of the search device are independent of the bearing of the mine. Thus,
we interpret D(r,0) as the probability that a mine at a distance of r
units from the ship will be detected. In particular, let D be a
function in V which is one inside the circle of radius s and
outside the circle of radius s + e. This is essentially a "cookie-
cutter" prize function. With our interpretation D represents a search
device which is perfect for detecting a mine inside a circle of radius s
and is useless for detecting a mine beyond s + £ units.
The ship's Captain is asked to give his utilities for the search
£ £devices D
, £ s £ 1. Suppose that his utility of the device D is
2 £ 2proportional to s + o(e); that is, U(D ) = k* (s +o(e)) for some
proportionality constant k. With this utility assignment, the Captain's
21
utility for a search device which gives perfect information for a radius of
r is proportional to the area of the circle of perfect information.
Now for any se[0,l], Corollary 1 gives
2tt 1
U0£) « D £ (r,e)f(r,6)rdrd6 = k(s 2+o(e))
0=0 r=0
where f(r,8) is the bivariate probability density function induced by










Since the capabilities of the search device are independent of the bearing
of the mine, the density function f (r,6) is constant with respect to












which implies that f^Cs) = — and, since f is a probability density,
K IT K
we find that k = tt. Thus, the Captain's subjective density of the
distance to the mine is uniform
22
(r) = I
£ r <: 1
therwise.( ol
Furthermore, the bivariate density of the location of the mine is uniform
over the unit disc.
5. Applications to Decision Theory
The preceding general structure can be specialized to cover
situations seemingly different from the examples discussed above. Here
we consider statistical decision problems of the form (0,P,p) in
Ferguson's notation.
Example 4 : Suppose the decision maker is confronted with two outwardly
indistinguishable coins, one (say 6..) with probability -z of heads
and the other (8„) with probability 1/3 of heads. He is asked to
select one coin and is allowed to observe the outcome of one toss of it.
The prizes he can get depend upon a second toss of the coin, as described
below. Let T denote the value of 8e0 = {6- ,6_} and xeX the value
observed on the second toss of the chosen coin. Let the class of prizes
R be [0,1] and u the identity function. Each function 6 = uoF
from OxX into [0,1] can be given as a four- tuple (a,b,c,d), where
a is the u-utility of the prize won if (T,X)(co) = (9 ,h) , similarly,
b is won if (6. ,t) occurs, c if (6-,h) and d if (e-,t). The
class of continuous functions from OxX into [0,1] with compact support
4
is thus Identified with V - X [0,1], Suppose the decision maker, having
j=l
observed the outcome X.. (w) = h on the selected coin, assigns U-utilities
to the extreme points (of V) e. = (6 ,6_ . ,6_ ,6, .) proportional to
j fchere 6 . . is the Kroneker delta)
.
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In order to make the measure y of Theorem 1 a probability
measure it suffices to set U(l, 1,1,1) = 1, so y{(9-,h)} = 1/10,
y{(9
1
,t)} = 2/10, y{(6
2
,h)} = 3/10, y{(6
2
,t)} = 4/10. This is the
conditional distribution of (T,X), given X.(aj) = h, from which the
conditional distribution v(* |h) of T given X..(aj) = h is v(0 |h) =
I y{(6 1tx)} = 3/10; v(eJh) = 7/10. The marginal distribution x of
x
L l
T has value at 6 proportional to v(6 |h) /f (h| 9) , where f(h|9) is
the conditional distribution of X. given T(co) = 9, evaluated at
X^(to) = h. Thus, since these masses summed over must be unity, we have







1(9^ = 2/9; t(9 2 ) = 7/9.
Similarly, the marginal distribution y of X is
/u\ B rvui 1 2 1 7 10 /..\ 17y(h) = P[X=h] = 2' , 9" + 3' , 9" = 27i YU) = Yf '
The Bayes profit of a strategy 6 = (a,b,a,b), which depends only upon
the second toss X of the coin, is r + r • rr + — + -~- • yr- . If
the outcome XAu) = h is ignored (or if a coin is again chosen from 0)
,
the Bayes profit is |"| + |1 • | + T| +
^y-J
• j = aY (h) + by(t) . On the
other hand, the Bayes profit of a strategy 6 = (a,a,b,b) depending only
upon nature's choice T of a parameter in is, given X, (w) = h,
3 7 2 7
a • y?) + D * Tn » whereas unconditionally it is a • -jr + b • -jr .
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1Example 5 : We consider next a simple problem (0,A ,L) , based upon an
example discussed by Chernoff and Moses [2], Suppose nature's choice
for today's weather is made from = {0.. (rain) ,6 Cshine) } . We must
decide whether to take a raincoat (a, ) or not (a~) . Suppose the












Let ft = 0, R = (0xA) and u be 1 - L on (0xA) , so u on (0xA)






















Suppose the decision maker assigns
U(6
L













similarly t({9 }) = 2/3. Since t(0) = 1, no further normalization is
needed and the decision maker's subjective prior of rain is 2/3. The
U-utility of any rule
2
is U(6) = 2a/3 + 3/3, the Bayes utility of 6.
Example 6 : As in the horse racing example, with the problem described in
Example 5 it might have been easier for the decision maker to assign
U-utilities initially to rules 5 which correspond to uoF with F(0.)
a distribution assigning unit mass over points in {0.}xA. This is
because if he knew nature's choice were 0. he would want to consider
l
only those prizes of the form (8., a.). Thus it might be relatively easy
for him to "value", in the U-utility sense, 6's associated with F's
mapping 6 into ({0.}xA)*; i = 1, 2. For example, if it were known
that 0~ (shine) was nature's choice, the most desirable rule corresponds
to taking action a (no coat) , which in turn might reasonably correspond
to the rule uoF , where F (0 ) is degenerate at (0 ,a_) and F~(0~)
is degenerate at (9„,a„). But this is precisely the rule 6~ of Example
5. Similarly, if one knew were chosen, the rule 6 = uoF in which
F (0 ) is degenerate at (0 ,a..) and F (0 ) is degenerate at (0„,a„)
is most desirable. Clearly,
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2/3 if 6 = Q
i -\ l-\ -{f ftJ
( 1/3 if
Imagine the decision maker assigns U(6,J = 5/9 and U(6 2 ) = 1/3 (as
before). It follows that the subjective prior is the solution t(9-),
t(6 ) to the system
U(6
3
) = 5/9 = 2/3 t(6
1





) =1/3 = 0- rCe^ + 1 • t(6
2),
giving T0-) 2/3, x(6 2 ) = 1/3 (normalization is again unnecessary
in this case)
.
Example 7 ; Consider next the game described above in which we can
observe the outcome on a random variable X (weather forecast) with





= 3/4 and P[X=xJeJ = 1/5. We now have the statistical
decision problem (0,D,p). Let ft = (OxX) , R = OxA and u = 1 - L
extended by expectation to (OxA) , as before. Let w, = (6, ,x, ),
a). = (6. ,x„) , o)« = (6 2 ,x-) and m, = (6 2 ,x2 ). Members F of F can
be represented as vectors (P.. ,P 2 ,P- ,P, ) in which P. = F(w.) is a
mass function over GxA. For the moment, restrict attention to
F((0.,x.)) that allocate their total mass to points in {6.}xA. In
this case, F maps points in {6.}xX to distributions over {'6.}xA,
*
so we may regard F as a mapping from X to A , that is, a behavioral
decision rule. For such F, the corresponding 6 (represented by
(d.. ,d_,d_ ,d.) where 6(w.) = d.) may have first two components in
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[0,2/3] and second two components in [1/3,1], Example rules In V are
the least desirable: 6
L
= (0,0,1/3,1/3)
take action a^ 5- - (2/3,2/3,1/3,1/3)
take action a~: 6
2
= (0,0,1,1)
follow the forecast (a.Sx.) : 6
3
= (2/3,0,1/3,1)
contradict the forecast (a.=x.): 6, = (0,2/3,1,1/3)
knowledge of nature's choice (a. =9.): 6,. = (2/3,2/3,1,1).
It is easily seen that 6,, 6„, 6_ and 5, correspond to extreme points
of the risk set S corresponding to the randomized rules in V , and
that points corresponding to 6, and 6„, as well as the segment
between, are in the lower boundary of S. Suppose the decision maker
assigns equal U-utilities to 6.. and 6~, so the line segment repre-
senting randomizations between 6- and 6~ will be in a U contour.
Then it should be the case that the induced subjective prior is the
26
least favorable prior, since the maximin utility (l--rr-) is achieved
by such a rule (i.e., the minimax loss is attained by a Bayes rule with
respect to the least favorable prior; the minimax rule is Bayes for that
prior). Accordingly, suppose U(6..) = U(6»). Since
f+t(e 2 ) • |u(6,) = T(ej • x(e
u(6
2
) = xCe^ • |+ x(e 2 ) - -if ,
it follows that t(6 ) = 16/21 and t(0
2
) = 5/21 which is indeed the
28
least favorable prior. As a check, the corresponding U-utility of the
37
minimax rule is -rr- , which is 1 - (minimax loss) .
6. Conclusions
We have shown the existence of a unique probability measure induced
by a decision maker's preferences or utilities over a set of alternatives.
Furthermore, we have shown how that probability measure can actually be
constructed. Our results have been obtained for a very general structure
on the decision problem. We require the standard conditions for the
existence of the utility functions, and we require that the sample space
ft be a locally compact Hausdorff space. This is a fairly weak restriction
on ft admitting, for example,
(1) all countable spaces with the discrete topology,
(2) all intervals on the real line with the standard
Euclidean topology,
(3) n-dimensional Euclidean space with the standard
topology, and
(4) the complex plane.
We have also required that the class F of prize functions be exactly the
class of all continuous functions from ft into k with compact support
(and hence the class of decision functions V is the class of all continuous
functions from ft into [0,1] with compact support). This can be a very
large class of functions, but we noted that the decision maker need not
express his utilities for the entire class V , but only for a subset
which generates the class. For the case where ft is countable, every
function D: ft+[0,l] is continuous with the discrete topology so that
29
our results apply to the countable case with no additional restrictions.
In addition to extending the previous results of Anscombe and Aumann [1]
to more general sample spaces and for larger classes of decision functions
,
we relax the assumption of the monotone relationship between the two
utility functions U and u (we show that the relationship does follow)
.
One may argue that, if the decision maker possesses the ability to
make arbitrarily fine judgment discriminations as is implied by the con-
sistency and rationality axioms of utility theory, knowledge of the imputed
probability distribution can add no additional information. However, what
knowledge of the probability distribution can do is enable the decision
maker to concentrate on a small subset of relatively simple decision alter-
natives. Once his utility evaluations for this set of alternatives are
determined, his subjective probability distribution can be extracted and
applied to evaluate the more complicated and uncertain alternatives so as
to agree with his original assessments. Furthermore, the probability dis-
tribution offers feedback to the decision maker useful for checking his
utility assessments, and it provides him a method of communicating his
personal feelings about the unknown state of nature.
30
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